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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Appeal is from the Court's Memorandum Decision, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment granting 
Summary Judgment for the Plaintiff. The Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah has jurisdiction to hear this Appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)e(iii). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Director of State Lands upheld an audit and demand for 
payment issued by the Division of State Lands. The Plaintiff 
filed a Declaratory Judgment action challenging the Director's 
decision. The trial court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and entered a Judgment reversing the decision of the 
Director. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented on this appeal are as follows: 
(1) Whether the trial court erred in entering Summary 
Judgment authorizing depletion of the trust assets for less than 
full value in view of Federal and State constitutional law 
governing school trust lands? 
(2) Whether the plain language of the lease may be 
rewritten by the court because one party claims it is ambiguous? 
(3) Whether Plaintiff should be barred from using the 
doctrine of estoppel to avoid paying monies owed to the school 
trust fund when it was Plaintiff's duty to report and pay the 
correct amount of royalties? 
1 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Enabling Act, §6: 
That upon the admission of said State into the Union, 
sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirty-
six in every township of said proposed state, and where 
such sections, or any parts thereof have been sold or 
otherwise disposed of by or under the authority of any 
Act of Congress, other lands equivalent thereto, in 
legal subdivisions of not less than one quarter section 
and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of 
which the same is taken, are hereby granted to said 
State for the support of common schools.... 
Utah Enabling Act §10: 
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for 
educational purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise 
provided, shall constitute a permanent school fund, the 
interest of which only shall be expended for the 
support of said schools, and such land shall not be 
subject to pre-emption, homestead entry, or any other 
entry under the land laws of the United States, whether 
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for 
school purposes only. 
Utah Constitution, Article X, §5: 
The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by an Act of 
Congress, approved February 21st, 1855, for the 
establishment of the University of Utah, and of all the 
lands granted by an Act of Congress, approved July 
16th, 1894, shall constitute permanent funds, to be 
safely invested and held by the State; and the income 
thereof shall be used exclusively for the support and 
maintenance of the different institutions and colleges, 
respectively, in accordance with the requirements and 
conditions of said Acts of Congress. 91 (Article X was 
amended, effective July 1, 1987 with Section 5 becoming 
Sections 5 and 7). 
Utah Constitution, Article XX, §1: 
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter 
be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands 
acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any person or 
corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired, are 
hereby accepted, and declared to be the public lands of 
the State; and shall be held in trust for the people, 
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to be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the 
respective purposes for which they have been or may be 
granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired. 
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-23: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land 
Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form 
of application, the form of lease, the annual rental, 
the amount of royalty and the basis upon which the 
royalty shall be computed, and such other details as it 
may deem necessary in the interest of the state. 
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-76: 
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by 
the State Land Board shall before execution by such 
board be approved as to form by the attorney general. 
30 U.S.C. §207(a): 
[A] lease shall require payment of a royalty in such 
amount as the Secretary shall determine of not less 
than 12 1/2 per centum of the value of coal as defined 
by regulation, except the Secretary may determine a 
lesser amount in the case of coal recovered by 
underground mining operations.... 
43 C.F.R. §3473.3-2: 
2. A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not 
less than 12 1/2% of the value of the coal removed from 
a surface mine. 
3. A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not 
less than 8% of the value of the coal removed from an 
underground mine, except that the (Minerals Management 
Service) may determine a lesser amount, but in no case 
less than 5% if conditions warrant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Utah Division of State Lands audited the payments under 
its coal leases on school trust lands. One of those leases was 
held by Plaintiff, Trail Mountain Coal Company. Demand was made 
to Plaintiff to pay royalties found by the audit to have been 
underpaid. (R.681 P.53) Plaintiff appealed the decision of the 
3 
auditors to the Director of the Division of State Lands. (R.683 
P.60-61) The Director, after a hearing, upheld the audit and the 
demand for payment. (R.684) Plaintiff then filed this action in 
the Seventh Judicial District Court, asking for a declaration 
that the State could not collect the unpaid royalties. A pre-
trial order was entered which included a list of undisputed facts 
and exhibits. (R.660) Both parties filed Motions for Summary 
Judgment. The trial court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment finding that Plaintiff owed nothing to the State. 
(Addenda 1, 2 and 3) It is from those Orders that this appeal is 
taken. 
The parties stipulated to a list of undisputed facts and 
exhibits. Those are set forth in the Pre-trial Order (R.660) 
The court based its decision on those facts and exhibits. (R.647, 
790, Addenda 1 and 3) This Statement of The Case will refer to 
the number of the paragraph (P) and the page in the Pre-trial 
Order which contains the facts relied on by the State. 
The United States, pursuant to the Utah Enabling Act, 
granted lands to the State of Utah to be used for the support of 
the common schools. The State of Utah holds that land as 
trustee. Management of those lands is by the Board of State 
Lands and the Division of State Lands. Utah Code Ann. §65-1-14. 
On February 8, 1965 Malcolm N. McKinnon, coal lease no. 
22603. (Addendum 4, R.664 P.3) The lease authorizes extraction 
of coal from school trust lands located in Emery County, Utah. 
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(R.664 P.5) The lease is perpetual, as long as coal is produced 
in commercial quantities, with a provision for adjustment at the 
end of each 20-year period. The lease was eventually acquired by 
the Plaintiff. (R.666, 670 P. 11, 20, 22) 
The United States Government owns numerous coal producing 
lands within the State of Utah, many of which are in Emery 
County. (R.687, 708-722 P. 70, Schedule I-IV, Addendum 5) 
Therefore, the royalty charged on federal coal leases generally 
becomes the prevailing market royalty rate for coal leases within 
the State.1 When State lease no. 22603 was issued by the State, 
the royalty rate on many federal coal leases was $.15 per ton. 
(R.684, 708-722 P.62, Schedules I-IV, Addendum 5) The paragraph 
(Article III Second) requiring the payment of royalty on the 
subject State lease requires Lessees: 
To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day 
of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty 
(a) at the rate of $.15 per ton of 2000 lbs. of coal 
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise 
disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the 
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal 
lessees of land of similar character under coal leases 
issued by the United State at that time, 
1
 Statement of Guy R. Martin, Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior, to the Energy Resources and Materials Production 
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources "Oversight Hearing on the Federal Coal Leasing 
Program," (June 12, 1980), wherein he testified: "Because the 
vast Federal reserves and their locational advantage place the 
government in a powerful market position, the Interior Department 
will be the price setter for western coal." 
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whichever is higher..•. (Addendum 4) 
State lease no. 22603 also requires the Plaintiff to prepare 
and forward to the State, each quarter, a certified statement as 
to the amount of production together with other information as 
required by the State Land Board. (Article III, Third) The 
State also retained the right to go upon the premises and conduct 
audits of the lessees' records. (Article XI) 
The federal coal lease royalty rate generally remained at 
$.15 per ton until August 4, 1976. On August 4, 1976 the Federal 
Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, 3 0 U.S.C. §§201-209 was 
enacted by Congress. (R.684 P.63) The Act and the regulations 
promulgated thereunder, increased the royalty rate on surface 
mines to 12 1/2% of the value of the coal produced and the 
royalty rate on underground mines to 8% of the value of the coal 
produced. (R.684-685 P. 63, 64) Between January 1, 1979 and 
December 31, 1985 twenty-three (23) coal leases were issued by 
the United States Bureau of Land Management on lands within the 
State of Utah. Eighteen (18) of those leases required a royalty 
payment of 8% of the value of coal. (R. 708-710, Schedule I, 
Addendum 5) Only one required a royalty rate of less than 8% and 
that royalty rate was 5% of the value of the coal. 
Upper level management of the Plaintiff knew about the 
passage of the Federal Coal Leasing Amendment Act of 197 6 and the 
regulations promulgated thereunder. (R.686 P.69) Plaintiff also 
held two federal leases which were operated from the same mine as 
the State coal lease. Federal Coal Lease U-082996 was issued on 
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July 1, 1962 and required a royalty rate of $.15 per ton. (R.688 
P. 76) On January 18, 1980 federal coal lease U082996 was 
modified with the addition of second parcel of property. The 
royalty rate of the added property was 8% of value. (R.688 P.78) 
On July 1, 1983 federal coal lease U082996 was readjusted and the 
royalty rate set at 8% of value for all coal mined from the land 
covered by that lease. (R.689 P.80) On March 1, 1983 Plaintiff 
also acquired Federal Coal Lease U49332. That lease also 
required a royalty of 8% of value. (R.689 P. 81) Effective 
January 1, 1986 the State coal lease was adjusted and the royalty 
rate on the adjusted State coal lease is 8% of value. (R.664 P.4) 
The lands that the Division of State Lands manages has 
thousands of mineral leases. The Division does not have the 
funds or the personnel to monitor each lease, or the payments 
received on those leases. Instead the State of Utah, as written 
in its lease provisions and regulations, requires its lessees to 
accurately provide information and to pay the correct amounts of 
royalties. (Addendum 4, R.678 P.42) Like reporting taxes, it has 
largely been an honor reporting system. In 1981 the Utah State 
Legislature appropriated funds for the Division of State Lands to 
hire an auditor to review income from its mineral leases. Richard 
Mitchell was hired. (R.678 P. 43) He set up an auditing 
procedure and started to audit the State's oil and gas leases. 
(R.678 P.43) In 1984 the Auditing Division was expanded and two 
auditors, Douglas E. Johnson and Ralph Aiello were hired. (R.678 
7 
P. 44) 
In December of 1984 the auditors started to review the State 
coal leases. The audit included an analysis of the U.S. Bureau 
of Land Management records on federal coal leases and an 
examination of the Plaintiff's and other State coal lessee 
records. (R.678 P.45) The auditors found that the coal lessees 
had, in certain instances, under reported production and failed 
to report other vital information. They also found that the 
royalty rate on federal coal leases had increased to 8% beginning 
in 1977, but the Plaintiff had failed to report and pay royalties 
at the prevailing federal rate. (R.679 P.47, 48) 
An audit report was prepared and submitted to the Division 
of State Lands. (R.680 P.49) The Director of the Division of 
State Lands established an audit committee to review the 
auditors' report. The audit committee reviewed the lease and the 
findings of the auditors7 report. Some adjustments were made to 
the audit report and it was approved. (R.680 P.50-52) * The audit 
report was then sent to the Plaintiff with a request for payment 
of the delinquent royalties together with interest. (R.681 P.53) 
The Plaintiff, upon receipt of the audit report, requested a 
hearing before the Director of the Division of State Lands. A 
hearing was held. The Director rejected the appeal and upheld 
the findings of the auditors. (R.683 P.60-61) 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal is from the trial court's grant of a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Summary Judgment is appropriate only when the 
pleadings, depositions, interrogatories and admissions on file, 
together with affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). This Court 
should consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
Defendants, Durham vs. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977), 
and affirm the decision only if the Court determines there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact and that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Briggs vs. 
Holcombe. 740 P.2d 281 at 283 (Utah 1987). This Court, in 
reviewing the issues of law, gives no deference to the trial 
court. Atlas Corporation vs. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225 
at 229 (Utah 1987). 
The issues before the Court have been decided against 
Plaintiff by the Director of State Lands. The Court, when 
reviewing the decision of the Director, should not override the 
Director's interpretation of the Division's rules, policies and 
regulations unless his decision is arbitrary or erroneous. This 
Court should only inquire as to whether the Director acted in 
excess of his powers in upholding the audit. McKnight vs. State 
Land Board, 381 P.2d 726 at 731 (Utah 1963), Atlantic Richfield 
Company vs. Hinkel. 432 F.2d 587 at 591 (10th Cir. 1970). 
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The Defendants agree that the controlling issues in the case 
are issues of law. The Defendants maintain that when the issues 
of law are correctly decided they are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Defendants maintain, however, that there are 
issues of fact in dispute which preclude entry of summary 
judgment for the Plaintiff. Defendants request that this Court 
review the legal issues, that those issues be decided in favor of 
Defendants, and that the case be remanded with instructions to 
enter judgment in favor of the Defendants. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The State of Utah, as a condition of statehood, 
acquired certain lands in trust for the benefit of the common 
schools. The State has a Constitutional and moral duty to obtain 
full value from the disposition of those lands. The trial court 
placed impermissible restrictions on the trust lands in question 
when it restricted the royalty rate the State could collect from 
those lands to $.15 per ton rather than allowing the State to 
collect the contractually-required market rate of 8% of value of 
the coal. 
2. The royalty provision in the coal lease is clear and 
should be given its plain meaning. The requirement that the 
Plaintiff periodically determine whether the federal royalty rate 
has changed and that it pay royalties on the changed rate does 
not create an ambiguity. Such provisions are common in long-term 
leases to insure that the parties pay according to prevailing 
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market terms. In this case, a fluctuating royalty rate is 
constitutionally required to insure that the trust fund receives 
full value for its lands. 
3. The Court should use rules of construction to clarify 
any ambiguity in the lease. The trial court erred when it 
rewrote the parties7 lease by limiting royalties to $.15 per ton. 
Not even the Plaintiff claims that the royalty rate should always 
remain at $.15 per ton. The lease should be construed to give 
meaning to all its provisions including subparagraph (b) of the 
royalty provision which provides for increases in the royalty 
rate. 
4. Estoppel should not be used by the Court to prevent the 
trust fund from receiving full value for its assets. The Utah 
Enabling Act requires the trust to receive full value and 
requires the State to manage the trust fund in its governmental 
capacity. To allow estoppel in this case would violate those 
constitutional requirements and would cost the trust fund in 
excess of five million dollars. 
5. The Plaintiff has suffered no injury, was aware of the 
facts which caused the royalty rate to increase, and had the duty 
to pay the correct royalties. The State is only asking that the 
Plaintiff pay what is required by the lease. Such a request 
should not be estopped. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
THE TRUST ASSETS OF THE STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS MAY 
NOT BE DEPLETED FOR LESS THAN FULL VALUE. 
The State lands which are subject to the coal lease in 
question are school trust lands. The interpretation of the lease 
and the other issues that were before the trial court were 
subject to rules of law established by the Utah Enabling Act, 
Constitutional provisions and case law. The trial court 
erroneously rejected the law governing school trust lands in its 
construction of the lease and in its holding that the State was 
estopped from obtaining fair market value for its trust lands. 
This argument will first set forth a brief historical background 
on the purpose and policy of trust lands and will then examine 
the case law which the trial court should have applied in 
deciding this case. 
A. The Historical Background Provides Essential 
Perspective. 
Utah is one of thirty (3 0) public land states whose Enabling 
Act granted lands to be used for the support of schools and 
institutions. L. Mall, Public Land and Mining Law, 44-47 [3 Ed. 
1981]. In Utah vs. Kleepe. 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978) rev'd 
on other grounds 446 U.S. 500 (1980) the Court explained the 
purpose of the school land grants: 
There were no federal lands within the borders of the 
original thirteen states when they adopted and ratified 
the United States Constitution. Thus, virtually all of 
the lands within their borders were subject to 
taxation, including taxation necessary for the 
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maintenance of their public; school systems. When other 
states were subsequently admitted into the Union, their 
territorial confines were "carved" from federal 
territories. The "public lands" owned and reserved by 
the United States within those territorial confines 
were not subject to taxation. This reservation by the 
United States created serious impediment to the "public 
land" states in relation to an adequate property tax 
base necessary to permit these states to operate and 
maintain essential government services, including the 
public school systems, It was in recognition thereof, 
i.e., in order to "equalize" the status of the newly 
admitted states with that of the original thirteen 
states, that the Congress enacted the federal land 
grant statutes. The specific purpose was to create a 
binding permanent trust which would generate financial 
aid to support the public school systems of the "public 
land" states. 
T h e utj ^ J C I ^ • . : _ _ . ; _ . • 1 
eac; - s~z * ,r * support common schools, i tah 
En** : .1 IL& Consuitut ?n, 
accepted those land. ; /•;..;:. L^; respective purposes L^ r 
which they had been rrr^ rrc:-: ' -n.-t r.nzicr f Utah, Article XX. 
B. The Law Requires The Recei^- _,.r -„-_.,,,_ ,a.^e . Jim 
The Disposition Of Trust Lands. 
The school land grants ,. . . - . • < ^  . *.n 
the United States and the St,.::- of T;~. \n There has been imposed 
upo 1: 1 the S tate o f Utah 1 
[a] binding and perpetual obligation to use the granted 
lands for the support of public education. All revenue 
from the sale or lease of the school grants was 
impressed with a trust in favor of the public schools. 
No State could divert school lands to other public 
purposes without compensating the trust for the full 
market value of the interest taken. 
Andrus vs. T'tah, 446 U.S. 500, 523-524, 64 L.Ed.2d 458, 474, 100 
13 
Sup. Ct. 1803 (1981). 
Beginning with the case of Trustees of Vincennes University 
vs. State of Indianaf 55 U.S. 268, 274 (1852) the Supreme Court 
of the United States has consistently held that a State holds 
school lands in trust for the benefit of its schools. Congress 
and the Courts have placed restrictions on the use of the trust 
lands so that they are not exploited for private advantage or 
depleted by State action or inaction. Lassen vs. Arizona, 385 
U.S. 458, 87 S.Ct. 584, 17 L.Ed.2d 515, 522 (1967). (While 
Lassen dealt with surface rights, recent cases make it clear that 
these restrictions also apply to mineral interests located on 
school trust lands. Jensen vs. Dinehart, 645 P. 2d 32, 35 (Utah 
1982), Alamo Land and Cattle Company vs. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 
96 S.Ct. 910, 47 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 (1976). 
The duty of the State, in managing mineral rights on trust 
lands, is to obtain full value for the trust assets: 
The royalty rate set by the state is important because 
it represents payment for a trust asset which will be 
gone forever once the mineral is removed from the 
ground. Therefore, the requirements of the Enabling 
Act and the trust concept are the most important 
factors to consider in determining an optimum royalty 
rate. If the rate is too low the state will be 
committing a breach of trust by diminishing the trust. 
Royalty payments are placed in a permanent trust fund, 
the corpus of which is invested; the trust is kept 
whole if fair market value is received. If the royalty 
rate is too low the trust will not be kept whole. 
3 State School Trust Lands and Oil and Gas Royalty Rates, Public 
Land Law Review, 119, 130 (1982). See also Kadish vs. Arizona 
State Land Department, 747 P.2d 1183, 1195 (Ariz. 1987). State 
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vs. Kleepe, supra at 758; State vs. University of Alaska, * ? A 
P.2d 807, 813 (Alaska 1981). 
To e n f o r c e Llu». u n p u i t a n l l u i s l (ini|pujM , lllln1 i uiii I !.. In in n 
consIstently rejected any State statutes, constitutional 
prov i s Lons an: id Coi lr t: : " ;ed dc <::txi nes which restric • t:* •.? state 
from obtaining full .*...* from the trust lands, Tr Radish vs. 
Arizona State Land Department, supra, the Supreme Court of 
fixed a 
flat royalty rate for mi nera] leases on state school trust lands. 
The court noted that federal law is supreme in this field and 
that: 
[n] either thi s court, nor the legislature, nor the 
people may alter or amend the trust provisions 
contained in the Enabling Act without congressional 
approval, 
severely ci.^cumscrir: v..o ; ,- : s*;*:, government t: f..-ci. *.r/i 
the assets of the common school fund. It analyzed the court 
cases dealinq with thi.i subject and pointed out that: 
[t]he courts have consistently construed the scope of 
federal land grants in favor of the government. In 
dealing with trust land ... all doubts must be resolved 
in favor of protecting and preserving trust purposes. 
LA 
The primary case discussing the Utah Enabling Act I s State 
of Utah vs. Kleepe, supra. :l ^ -. , ,,**••». ^.rp'-. "in 
1 ; -* - ^j . • « - - • - i e 
had ic eceived pursuant * . : ,;:.*;: : .-.. • . :•. • after 
reviewing the Utah Enabling Act and the historical development of 
trust lands, stated: 
The school land grant and its acceptance by the state 
constitutes a solemn compact between the United States 
and the state for the benefit of the state's public 
school system. 
Id. at 758. 
Recent cases from other jurisdictions have consistently 
rejected attempts to limit the income received by the school 
trust. In Anderson vs. Board of Education, 256 N.W.2d 318 (Neb. 
1977) the Nebraska Supreme Court approved the resale of school 
trust property after a higher upset bid was received after the 
first sale. It stated that the constitution: 
imposes on the Board the duty of obtaining the highest 
price possible for all trust property it may sell. 
Id. at 321. 
In Oklahoma Education Association vs. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 
(Ok. 1981) the Supreme Court of Oklahoma struck down a law 
authorizing low-interest loans to farmers from the funds of the 
school trust fund. In doing so the court said: 
No disposition of such lands or funds can be made that 
conflict either with the terms and purposes of the 
grant in the Enabling Act or the provisions of the 
Constitution relating to such land and funds. The 
State has an irrevocable duty, as Trustee, to manage 
the trust estate for the exclusive benefit of the 
beneficiaries, and return full value from the use and 
disposition of the trust property. 
Id. at 235. 
In County of Skamania vs. Washington, 685 P.2d 576, 582 
(Wash. 1984) a state statute which allowed purchasers of timber 
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from trust lands to default so as to avoid insolvency due t :: • e L 
drop in timber sales was held unconstitutional. 
Alamo Lariu. i.« . ..-_i.-_:_^s£ L .U.^« i t . , * ~ _ , _. -^^ii^ 
3 05 (1976), the federal government .. ondemned schoc, \ . - * lands 
inn I ucii r " sections leased • > *' * r. , , . : Commenting c *• h^ 
validity of =* school i , .„ ieasehc. 
value, the .rt considered <\ t.rotect.i v-> iTc.visio:, container; in 
the Mew " -
 (-z\ • *..--*•":*- the 
ini t i^'. :iSi * . TIC . .edbii l-;ild..v ; * . * - :J - , 1 d I. I .i . * - * 3 
United States Supreme Court h^\ *•• * -, • -r>- lease : r. - lands 
was for- a r^r
 : r 
value, the ::^ se was veil. 
T " - - i*- i-16 3, cue':- a ~ the 
Plaintxi.1 , - —larged with knowledge . : ; u ^ ,K: •: ji-o 
subjec- * ^  : r * obtain full value for the trust. State 
vs. Phil 1 ips Pe trol ~ - -_^i*-. * 
State vs. Lamacus , . ' * Seidel vs. 
Seward, 133 NW, 2d °->^ State vs. Board of 
Educational Lands and Funds i _ Nebraska, I-. 
1954) and Department of State Lands vs. Pettibone. 702 P.2d -le, 
9H.7 (Mont , I 'ill!.) 
C. Trust Land Law And Policy Should Be Applied To The 
Facts Of This Case. 
The Stat- of Uv r* has thp duty to receive full market value 
from. + - ispositio* -* * * • :hool trust lands 'Vlw market 
roy a 1 * . . 11 o : J L a L e o i; U t a 1 i, i s c o n 1t' < i ,1 1 e d 
by the United States which has the vast majority of coal 
reserves. Lessees require long-term leases because of the 
capital expenditures involved. It would have been an 
impermissible restriction on the trust assets if the State would 
have set a flat $.15 per ton royalty on its long term coal 
leases. Kadish vs. Arizona State Land Department, supra at 1195. 
It is equally impermissible for the court to judicially set the 
royalty rate at a flat $.15 per ton. The State therefore, 
drafted an escalator clause in its coal lease which tied the 
royalty provision to the prevailing federal rate. That escalator 
clause insured that the State would, throughout the term of the 
lease, receive full market value. 
The State also implemented rules and regulations which 
provide for interest and penalties on delinquent royalty 
payments. Those provisions further insure that the trust 
receives full market value; otherwise, the trust would be 
depleted as a result of the time value of money. Biork vs. April 
Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977). 
The Plaintiff, as a party dealing with the trust and 
pursuant to the terms of the lease, had the duty to pay the 
correct amount of royalty. When an audit was performed by the 
State it showed that the Plaintiff owed to the trust fund over 
five million dollars. The trial court, by refusing to enforce 
the escalator provision of the lease, by refusing to require the 
payment of interest on delinquent royalties, and by amending the 
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l e a s e * . : r o y a l t i e s i r per t r ' i iposed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y 
imp * ' Uie i r u b c r * "h -* d e c i s i o n i n 
t h i s c j i e , t t.i-' *s.. -.-* ' ' "^d, »«= ^ *. . . . •" ovp r ive 
m i l ] *~ ^ ] '*rs * i> *>ntract c rea te ; : : by l * : r\ . * runs 
C . ; . . _ tie 
i. 
Thur * J :un bei' >. * ar.^ m x. JUS pos.i.-i . laving 
v, i contract whic^ violates "the general! - -ccepted 
doctrine ?* +-^1^ country 4«,. every contrar „ •/ 
is vcii," Baker vs. Latses, 6 3 Utah . . 2d - 555 
(^  - .-. - -_—L_ / :iw-I^^^^ * - . ., :^- ___!_ ~* *" ~ DO P. 
491 L-1,. icldir. J * -id as against public \ ^ - onLract to 
pay fees f~- c-rn.ce . - - processes where v * — e ^ s< * : the 
contra_
 A , t ^,se-
Payette Lumber Company vs. Challis Independent School District, 
No, 1 of Custer Count> , 46 Icl. 103 , 268 P. 26 (19 2 8) (ho 1 dir.q rhat 
judicial determinations of public policy must recognize a*. , .^.d 
to any appl icable legislate enactments). 
The. I nr.taint IM In r^ '/^ r • HI1 and fpmandpii In the 
trial court with instructions that the escalator clause be 
enforced and that the trust fund receive royalty rates at* the 
prevailing market t it M nil nl tin 'moved 
together with interest as provided by the regulations. 
POINT II. THE ESCALATION CLAUSE RELATING TO ROYALTIES 
IS CLEAR; THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S 
DETERMINE THE PREVAILING FEDERAL ROYALTY RATE DOES NOT 
MAKE THE CLAUSE AMBIGUOUS. 
The Court, as a matter of law, is to give the provisions of 
a contract their plain meaning as ascertained from the instrument 
itself. The Court should look to the entire instrument and give 
meaning to all provisions. Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636 P.2d 
1060 at 1061 (Utah 1981). The trial court erred when it ignored 
the plain meaning of the royalty provision and the intent of the 
parties when entering into the contract and rewrote the lease 
deleting the escalator provision of the royalty clause. 
A reading of the royalty provision in the lease (Article III 
Second) shows that it is clear and complies with the intent of 
the parties that the trust lands receive the going royalty rate. 
It states that the royalty rate will be $.15 per ton (which was 
the federal rate when the lease was signed) or if the prevailing 
federal rate increases on similar lands then the royalty rate 
increases to that new rate. The trial court, apparently, was 
under the misconception that because the escalator clause 
required the Plaintiff to determine the prevailing rate from 
facts outside the lease that somehow an ambiguity was created. 
Such a provision is not defective if there is a formula or method 
to set the price. Ferris vs. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 359 (Utah 
1979). 
Escalator clauses in long-term mineral leases are common 
provisions. Almost all escalator clauses or "favored nation" 
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clauses require the parties to ascertain a fluctuating rate from 
f a c t s c iu 1.1 > 11 1 ease, See e. q , Energy Reserves 
Group, Inc. , vs. Kansas Power and Light Company, 459 U, S . 400, 
417 (198 3) , Amoco Production Company vs. Stauffer Chemical 
Company of Wyominu -Qlii-.^r^.- 1*3. 
Company vs. The Howard Corporation. -: - ^ . * ~6 7x. 
1 —--rta - , ui facts oucsiue tne ie^ ** ^  - r nto 
effect :v,- ,cuse pi^v.sions, does nnt- rrpat-. a."x'iv. 
Instead, sv-": provisions are drafted t. insure that rates, i.uch 
a. : . . **-- * - ^y 
protecting both p-v:^  iurir. 7 :;e r :* -^  trie lease. 
The rrTT"*"'tv ^r^ ** IT. ccn^^ine-i iv the c'~ntr~4«o~ c '*v :- ~ a 
formul . ^ . .... . c^4.'. . Subsection (b1 ^ the 
provision srates that the r-v airy payment to he paid by the 
F. :-*"'•• i -, determ in«-:" 1 by fiu prevailing federal rate on lands 
of similar character under cual leases issued by the tederal 
government, Plaintiff has tiht*» duty to determine any change in 
thij Inderal r jyditv r. die i!«t Kede^a1 Coa ] Leasinq A111 ^ dments 
Act of 1976 increased the royalty rate to 8% of the value of the 
coal produced on federal coal leases. The federal government 
owns the ma j or i ty c 1; co..i 1 r etju 1 ves 111 U lah. UHILL ± j / j , J,1 . I1 , ' 
coal leases issued t, tr.- federal government in the State require 
.'* • • * .ue. Tne federal government has 
aij;. adjusr ; rr.ar/ ; ,;.o L^a^as thereby increasing the royalty 
rate u i „ ^,.,v>; — , Schedules I-IV, Addendum b) Those facts, 
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applied to the royalty provision requires that a royalty rate of 
8% of value be paid to the trust fund. 
The plain meaning of the provision is that the royalty rate 
to be paid by the Plaintiff would change when the federal royalty 
rate increased. Plaintiff does not argue that $.15 is the 
prevailing federal rate for federal leases of land of similar 
character and concedes that the federal rate is higher than the 
royalty payment they paid prior to 1976. Plaintiff, to avoid 
paying the correct royalty, instead tries to claim the lease is 
ambiguous. A reading of the plain language of the lease, coupled 
with the law governing trust lands, and the change in federal 
royalty rates supports only one construction of the lease. That 
construction is that the prevailing federal rate on underground 
coal leases has increased to 8% of value and that Plaintiff must 
pay royalties at that rate to provide full value to the trust. 
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POINT III. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT IGNORED THE LAW 
REGARDING TRUST LANDS, THE ESCALATOR PROVISIONS OF THE 
LEASE, AND THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES AND IMPOSED A FLAT 
$.15 PER TON ROYALTY RATE. 
A. Any Ambiguous provision should Be Resolved By 
Rules Of Construction Instead Of Being Deleted From The 
Lease. 
If '' '*• 'i'^  ermines ther^ : "* .~ '-rr:--:;;* ~ * ::& lease 
then the COu^ ^iwuid apply ceria... _±.:-L, . : . ;_ ire ./cion to 
interpret r *- , ir;.; *>.- ambiguous t revision. :.e '^ou: - should 
no t del I- - * * conti • • . "'* =- • - ' icti on 
are: the intent o f the parties when entering into the 
contract controls the meaning of the contract, Utah Valley Bank 
vs. Tanner, supra at 1061; (2) existing 1 aw whi ch affec ts the 
provision is considered part of tt le contract and governs its 
constructioi i, .Robinson vs . Joint School District, 596 P. 2d 4 36, 
438 (Ida. 1 9 79), Farmers Investment Company vs. Pima Mining 
Company, 523 P., 2d 437, 489 (Az. 197 1) ; (3) consideration should 
be g i v e n t < :> 1 1 i e t; u b j e c t in a t t e i , i I a 11 i r e a i i d p u r p o s e o f 1: h e 
contract and the motives of the parties, Nagle vs. Club 
Fontainbleu, -IMS P M M/,, 348 (Utah '- • :cntracc 
should be viewed from the perspective o~ * ,:o j^r-.^. - "imp 
it was signed, DeBouis v s . Nigh, 584 P. 2d ^33, £.- V~ ,r. c ; 
(' ) \ lv cc: i ii t si: ioi :i ] I :j:I ,; re th< = enti i : e : - ana not 
ignore any of the provisions of the contract ^ :e^r:fo the 
contract; Hal Taylor Associates vs. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d 
74 3, ; 19 (Utah 1:932) a t id (6) 1 :1 le • ::•< a itr ac t in isl : 1: >e i mi n 
liberally to protect the public interest, Public Service Company 
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vs. Denver, 387 P.2d 33, 36 (Colo. 1963), Restatement of 
Contracts 2d §207. 
If these rules of construction are applied to the royalty 
provision, the interpretation given by the State is the correct 
and reasonable one. The State, as trustee, is required to have a 
royalty provision which provides a maximum value to the trust 
fund. A royalty rate that would fluctuate as market conditions 
changed was required. To have set a flat royalty rate would have 
been unconstitutional. Kadish vs. Arizona State Land Department, 
supra at 1195. The Federal Government owns the majority of coal 
reserves in the State of Utah and therefore, the royalty rate 
charged by the Federal Government constitutes the prevailing 
market rate in the State of Utah. At the time the lease 
provision was drafted the federal royalty rate was generally $.15 
per ton. The royalty provision, therefore, was drafted setting a 
minimum royalty of $.15 per ton, but providing an escalator 
clause tied to the prevailing federal royalty rate. The 
escalator clause was required by law and the obvious intent of 
the parties, when the contract was entered into, was to provide a 
mechanism whereby the State would always receive the going market 
royalty rate from its trust lands. When one ties that 
information and construction, to the undisputed facts it shows 
that the federal royalty rate remained at $.15 per ton until 
1976. At that time the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act was 
passed and as a result the royalty rate on federal leases was 
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increased to 8%. The undisputed facts show that from 19 ; 9 to the 
present ail newly issi ^  * federc leases ^ " tah, except for c: ne, 
were at t he r. i \ \ » of 8 - • Je t o r u I: Stc t:e I ands 
properly construed the lease t require payment of royalties at 
8%. 
B. The Plaintiffs Have Never Contended That The 
Royalty Should Always Remain At $.15 Per Ton. 
One of the things that is certain about the royalty 
provision, in addition t- :> the pla: r neming of Subsection : is 
that, the con tracting parties ii I ter ^  -...!.- .Id 
change if federal royalty rates increased. The Piaintirf argues 
that t: 1 ie C• i)i irt shoi :i ] d ] ook at pa-" practices of -.no parries to 
determine the meaning of the royalty provision. The past 
practices of the parties are of no benefit at all in construing 
t. ., . ,. • / :; - "t 
practi/r c */>:- parties, o: paying tne rare speciriec - *der 
Si::- s^  :~ar, nothing T: J; W . U I Subparagraph '^ich 
surely must also fc- -;;ven *>fra^\. \i r.e contract niii:- - ;.>e constr ued 
to give effect t - or :v is ions. Hal Taylor Associates vs. 
Union America, 1 __. =ilL.: " " rouiem with 
Plaintiff's claim : : nterpr^ _at.ion o* \: * r^ya.rv provision is 
that it ignores Subparagraph b. That is not interpretation, that 
I S i-.ii-;1.1 e c t : - , . ' • ' " • 
Plaint.fr does n :z argue that $.15 Is the prevailing federal 
r a t e £ o r fecjerax leases on laiid of similar character under . TKII 
leases issued by the United states during the time period (.overcd 
2 5 
by the audit. Its silence concedes that the rate is something 
higher than $.15. However, because they do not like the higher 
rate, Plaintiff claims ambiguity and that it should be allowed to 
continue to pay at $.15 per ton as provided under Subparagraph a. 
This has nothing to do with the intent of either party at the 
time of the execution of the lease. Indeed, that so called 
interpretation flatly contradicts the parties' intent at the time 
it was signed. In this particular case the undisputed facts 
establish that the prevailing federal rate is 8% of value. Any 
changes in the rate can be easily determined by review of Bureau 
of Land Management records. 
C. State Statutes Prohibit The Amending Of The Lease 
Without The Land Board's Approval. 
There is a difference between construing a provision and 
ignoring it. To ignore and not enforce Subparagraph b of the 
royalty provision of the lease constitutes a rewriting of the 
terms of the lease without the necessary approval of the 
Director, the Land Board or the Attorney General. Morgan vs. 
Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976). Utah Code 
Ann. §65-1-76 requires: 
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by 
the State Land Board shall before execution by such 
board be approved as to form by the attorney general. 
§65-1-23 Utah Code Ann., requires: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land 
Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form 
of application, the form of lease, the annual rental, 
the amount of royalty and the basis upon which the 
royalty shall be computed, and such other details as it 
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may deem necessary in the interest of the state. 
The trial court should not be allowed to unilaterally 
rewrite the parties7 lease. If there is an ambiguity, the trial 
court should be directed to apply proper rules of construction to 
clarify the ambiguity and give meaning to all of the royalty 
provisions. 
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POINT IV, ESTOPPEL IS NOT AVAILABLE IN THIS CASE. 
The traditional rule is that the doctrine of estoppel cannot 
be asserted against a state government in matters affecting 
public policy, public revenues or when the state is acting in its 
governmental capacity. Estoppel is not applied in matters where 
an action is prohibited by a state statute or is the result of 
unauthorized acts of its officials. Atlantic Richfield Company 
vs. Hinkel. 432 F.2d 587, 591 (10th Cir. 1970). 
There are many good reasons for this rule including 
safeguarding public funds and interests which are subject to 
changes in political opinions and changes in public officials and 
employees. Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, 646 P.2d 
715, 718 (Utah 1982). Restrictions on the application of legal 
doctrines when public lands are involved is common such as in the 
area of eminent domain, Utah Code Ann. §78-34-3 or adverse 
possession. There are even greater restrictions and protections 
when trust funds and trust lands are involved because of the 
constitutional requirements and important policies. 
The trial court's ruling that the State was estopped from 
enforcing the royalty provisions of the lease was wrong for the 
following reasons: (a) the important policies and law governing 
trust lands prohibits the use of estoppel when the doctrine is 
used to diminish the income received by the trust fund; (b) the 
State acts in its governmental capacity when managing trust lands 
and, therefore, is subject to estoppel in only limited 
28 
circumstances; and (c) the undisputed facts will not support a 
finding of estoppel. 
A. The Important Policy Of Receiving Full Value For 
The Trust Fund Prohibits The Use Of Estoppel, 
The trial court erred when it concluded that Defendants were 
estopped, as a matter of law, from enforcing the terms of the 
lease and obtaining full value for the trust fund. Courts which 
have considered whether estoppel should be applied when it would 
reduce the income to school trust lands have consistently held 
that the important public policy of providing full value to the 
trust lands prohibits the imposition of a defense such as 
estoppel. 
In State vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 258 P.2d 1193 (Ok. 
1953) the clerk for the State failed to reserve minerals when 
issuing a certificate of purchase for land. The Court, in 
allowing reformation of the documents restoring the mineral 
rights to the State, held that the State was acting in a 
governmental capacity and that it would be a violation of the 
State's trust responsibilities to allow divestiture of the 
mineral rights. Furthermore, the court said that the purchaser 
is charged with notice that the State is acting as a trustee and 
is charged with notice that the State could only act in 
compliance with rules and regulations of its position as trustee. 
The Court held that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply to 
those acts which were beyond the authority of the State employee 
when he issued the deed and failed to reserve the mineral rights. 
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Id, at 1199. The State employee in this case had no authority, 
either intentionally or accidentally, to set a royalty rate lower 
than the prevailing federal rate. 
In State vs. Northwest Magnesite Company, 182 P.2d 643 
(Wash. 1947) the Commissioner of public lands promised the lessee 
of school trust lands that the lessee could remit royalties on 
the basis of net profits. That representation was contrary to 
the statute and the lease. The Court, in holding that the lessee 
was required to pay royalties in accordance with the terms of the 
lease, held that the State was acting in a governmental capacity, 
that estoppel could not be used to enforce the promise of the 
Commissioner of Public Lands, that Defendants payment of money 
did not constitute an estoppel, and that the State was entitled 
to interest on the unpaid royalties. Id. at 662. 
In the case of Department of State Lands vs. Pettibone, 702 
P.2d 948 (Mont. 1985), Defendants claimed that they were entitled 
to certain water rights. The Montana Supreme Court denied 
Defendants' claim and found that the water rights were part of 
the school trust lands of the State of Montana. The Court held 
that there were three important principals governing school trust 
lands. Those principals were: (1) the Enabling Act created a 
trust which the State could not violate; (2) the Enabling Act was 
to be strictly construed according to fiduciary principles; and 
(3) the Enabling Act pre-empted State laws and constitutions. It 
further held that Courts are to be very protective of the trust 
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and emphatic of the need to preserve the value of the trust 
corpus. The Court also found that an interest in State land 
cannot be conveyed without adequate compensation and that any use 
or management which would devalue State lands is impermissible. 
It said that anyone who acquires an interest in trust lands does 
so subject to the trust and that trust lands are subject to a 
different set of rules than other public lands. Id. at 956. 
The holdings in the above cases are consistent with the 
manner in which this Court has decided issues involving estoppel 
against the State. The general rule in Utah is that an estoppel 
cannot be applied against the State if to do so would violate 
State statute. Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, 
supra at 719. In the case at hand, the application of an 
estoppel would be a violation of both State statutes and the 
Constitution of Utah. Even if the Court determines that estoppel 
could apply, the Plaintiff must prove that estoppel is necessary 
to prevent manifest injustice and the public interest would not 
be unduly damaged by imposing the defense. Utah State University 
vs. Sutro and Company, 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982), Celebrity 
Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689, 694 
(Utah 1979). In Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company the 
Court stated: 
[t]he rule which precludes the assertion of estoppel 
against the government is sound and generally should be 
applied, except only in appropriate circumstances as 
hereinabove stated, where the interest of justice 
mandates an exception to the general rule. In cases 
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is 
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whether it appears that the facts may be found with 
sufficient certainty, and the injustice to be suffered 
is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception. 
Id., at 720. 
The essential policy and public interest in trust land cases 
is the requirement that the trust fund receive full value for its 
assets. To allow the application of estoppel in this case would 
defeat that purpose. As pointed out in Utah State University vs. 
Sutro and Company and Celebrity Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied 
when it would violate such an important public purpose. See 
also. Western Kane County Service District vs. Jackson Cattle 
Company, 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987) (reversing a ruling 
based on estoppel and stating ff[w]e are extremely reluctant to 
apply the doctrine of estoppel against the assertion of rights in 
a public highway by a governmental entity"). 
In addition, there is no manifest injustice involved. An 
assertion of manifest injustice requires the Plaintiff to prove 
with certainty that paying royalties at $.15 per ton is a higher 
purpose than that of the trust fund receiving full value for its 
assets. Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, supra at 
718. The injustice in this case is the trial courts application 
of estoppel giving the Plaintiff a windfall at the expense of the 
school trust fund. 
32 
B. Estoppel Is Applicable Only In Very Limited 
Circumstances When The State Is Acting In Its 
Governmental Capacity. 
The question of whether the State of Utah acted in its 
governmental or proprietary capacity when managing school trust 
lands was considered by the Utah Supreme Court in Duchesne County 
vs. State Tax Commission, 140 P.2d 335 (Utah 1943). This Court 
held: 
Here the trusteeship of the fund was vested in the 
State by the Enabling Act as a condition of statehood, 
as a condition to the right of the State to be born, 
and imposed upon the State at its birth by the 
instrument of its creation as a condition of its life 
as a government. It must therefore be held by the 
state in a governmental capacity. 
Id., at 343. 
This ruling is in line with rulings in other states which 
have considered the issue as well as the present case law of the 
State of Utah regarding the distinction between proprietary 
functions, and governmental functions as to which the State 
retains its immunity. A governmental function has been defined 
as a function which is performed only by a government entity and 
is essential to the core of governmental activity. Cox vs. Utah 
Land and Mortgage Corporation. 716 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 1986), 
Metropolitan Financial Company vs. State, 714 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 
19 86) . The Utah Legislature has recently expanded that 
definition to include non-essential as well as essential 
governmental activities. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2(4)(a). The 
management of school trust lands is an obligation imposed upon 
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the State by a federal statute and accepted by the Utah 
Constitution, It is an activity that can only be performed by 
the State. 
As already established, the Court must be extremely 
reluctant to apply estoppel when the State is acting in its 
governmental capacity. When public lands are involved, still 
more restrictive rules govern. For example, adverse possession 
cannot be applied against public lands. Peterson vs. Johnson, 34 
P.2d 697, 698 (Utah 1934). Great protection is given to trust 
lands because doctrines such as estoppel or adverse possession 
defeat constitutional requirements to receive full value for the 
trust and violate the State's governmental powers. Department of 
State Lands vs. Pettibone, supra at 952. 
It is hard to imagine any other act of the State which would 
be more governmental in nature than the trust responsibilities 
imposed by the Enabling Act and accepted by the State in its 
Constitution and as a requirement to obtain statehood. Estoppel 
cannot be used to prevent the State from functioning in this 
important government capacity. 
C. Estoppel Would Prohibit The State From Correcting 
Errors Found Through The Audit Process. 
The audit, by the State, of Plaintiff's records showed that 
in addition to under-reporting the royalty rate Plaintiff also 
did not report the production of 41,433 tons. (R.798) Plaintiff 
does not claim the State is estopped from collecting for that 
production even though the State accepted, without objection 
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inaccurate quarterly reports and payments for the quarter 
involved. Where is the line between what Plaintiff claims in 
subject to estoppel and that which is not subject to estoppel? 
One of the problems with asserting the doctrine of estoppel, 
in a case such as this, is that it is of no value for the State 
to audit its lessees. When the Plaintiff, or any other lessee, 
holding a State lease reports an incorrect royalty rate, an 
incorrect sales price,, an incorrect volume of coal produced or 
any other factor going into the calculation of the royalty those 
errors are only discovered when an audit is made. If the State 
has to make an audit each time a payment comes in and determine 
immediately, the accuracy of each report, the public interest 
will be severely damaged. It is impossible for the State to 
audit each report when it is received. Therefore, the lease and 
the State requires the lessee to accurately report and pay 
royalties. The State then conducts periodic audits to insure 
compliance. 
D. The Undisputed Facts Do Not Supnort A Finding Of 
Estoppel. 
The trial court erred when it concluded that the State was 
estopped from collecting delinquent royalty payments. Its 
finding that the Plaintiff has relied on the State's lack of 
protest, and had mined the coal in reliance upon a royalty rate 
of $.15 per ton was wrong. The facts upon which reliance and 
detriment could correctly be founded were disputed by the 
Defendants. (R.734) Indeed, the undisputed facts showed that it 
35 
was the State that relied on the Plaintiff to pay the correct 
royalty amount. (R.678 P.42) The Plaintiff has the duty to the 
State to calculate and pay the correct royalty. (Lease No. 22603, 
Article III Third) The State did not have a duty to Plaintiff to 
collect the correct royalty although it has such a duty to the 
school trust. 
If the doctrine of estoppel were applicable in this case the 
Plaintiff must prove: (1) a false representation or concealment 
of a material fact; (2) made with knowledge of the facts; (3) 
made to a party without knowledge or the means of knowledge of 
the real facts; (4) made with the intention that the 
representation be acted upon; and (5) the parties to whom the 
representation was made, relied or acted upon is injured. Colman 
vs. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah 1987). 
One is not entitled to rely on erroneous or unauthorized 
statements of a government employee. Dansie vs. Murray City, 560 
P.2d 1123 at 1124 (Utah 1977), Atlantic Richfield vs. Hinkel, 
supra at 591. If a person has the means to determine the actual 
facts estoppel does not apply. Morgan vs. Board of State Lands, 
supra. To claim estoppel against the government, the injury must 
be substantial. Paying what is owed under the lease is not an 
injury. Barnes vs. Woodf 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1988); Williams vs. 
PSC, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988); and Utah Department of 
Transportation vs. Reagan, 751 P.2d 270 (Utah 1988). 
The undisputed facts will not support a finding of estoppel. 
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It was the Plaintiff who was responsible to correctly report the 
royalty rate and payments. (R.275 P.34) It was the Plaintiff who 
had substantial dealings with the federal government and who was 
aware of the increase in the federal royalty rate (R.686, 688 
P.69, 75-82) and it was the State that relied on the Plaintiff to 
accurately report and accurately pay the correct royalty amount. 
(R.678 P.42) The undisputed facts support a finding of estoppel 
against the Plaintiff and not in favor of the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff claimed that estoppel should be applied because 
the State failed to notify Plaintiff of the higher royalty rate. 
Silence by the State will not support estoppel, especially when 
the State did not know the facts but was relying on the 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff also claimed that it would be unjust to 
require it to pay the additional royalties. The Plaintiff paid 
the federal government royalties at 8%. (R. 29 P.78-81) It paid 
an overriding royalty of 8% to a previous owner of the State 
lease. Most important the sales price for Plaintiff's coal was 
based on Plaintiff paying an 8% royalty. (R.739, 756 which are 
Exhibits 89 and 90 from the Pre-trial Order) Plaintiff achieves 
a windfall by selling coal at a price which assumes it is paying 
an 8% royalty to the State and then Plaintiff only pays the State 
$.15 per ton. Plaintiff has already received from its customers 
the monies the State seeks to collect. (R.700, Exhibits 89 and 90 
to Pre-trial Order, 739 at 746, 756 at 763) Plaintiff will only 
be required to pay what the lease requires. Such does not 
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constitute injury or injustice. Barnes vs. Wood, supra, Williams 
vs. PSC, supra. If this Court determines that the doctrine of 
estoppel could apply in this case, then the matter should be 
remanded to the trial court for trial with Plaintiff having the 
burden to prove it has met the elements required for estoppel. 
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CONCLUSION 
The law requires that the State of Utah receive a maximum 
return on its disposition of school trust lands. The State 
implemented that requirement by linking the royalty rate on the 
lease to the prevailing federal royalty rate. The decision of 
the trial court imposes improper restrictions on the trust lands. 
The State asks this Court to reverse the decision of the trial 
court and remand the case with instructions to enter judgment in 
favor of the State of Utah upholding the decision of the Director 
of State Lands. 
Respectfully submitted this day of^September, 1988. 
NIELSEN/S SENIOR 
Attorneys/for Appellant 
By; A h ^ S U Xt \J lAhjAjwjJ t 




IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH MILES, 
DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF 
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY, THE 
UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS AND 
FORESTRY, THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN, 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 4847 
The plaintiff has moved the Court for partial summary 
judgment and has supported the same by the stipulated facts as 
set forth in the agreed Pre-trial Order and other supporting 
affidavits, and has submitted their Memorandum of Legal Points 
and Authorities. The defendants have objected to the Motion and 
have filed their own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
have submitted their Memorandum of Legal Points and Authorities. 
The defendants have objected to the publication of 
certain depositions requested by the plaintiff and referred to 
by the plaintiff in their Memorandum. The Court finds that the 
Motion is well taken and will not order publication of the 
depositions at this time, and will not consider any of the 
matters referred to in the deposition in the disposition of 
these motions. 
The Court finds that there is no dispute as to the 
material facts in this case and has concluded therefrom that 
the plaintiff is entitled to partial summary * judgment as prayed 
for and grants the plaintifffs motion. 
The Court has further concluded that the defendants 
are not entitled to partial summary judgment and denies their 
motion. 
The factual situation is nearly identical to the fact 
situation as shown in Carbon County Case No. 14890, Plateau 
Mining Company v. The Division of State Lands and Forestry, 
et al. , and the Court has attached hereto a copy of its opinion 
in that case to show the reasoning of the Court, and the legal 
analysis used by the Court, in reaching its decision in this 
case. 
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to prepare 
a formal judgment in accordance with this decision. 
DATED this / / ^ day of April, 1988. 
/ 
BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLATEAU MINING COMPANY, a 
Delaware Corporation, and 
CYPRUS WESTERN COAL EQUIPMENT 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,] 
plaintiffs, 
vs . 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE ] 
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE ] 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND ] 
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF ] 
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; THE ) 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL ) 
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN, ] 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ] 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL ] 
RESOURCES, j 
Defendants. ) 
l MEMORANDUM DECISION 
> ON MOTIONS FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil NO. 14890 
The plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment from 
the Court declaring that the royalty provision contained in the 
State Lease of the defendants is ambiguous and that it should 
be construed in light of the parties course of performance; 
that the lease is not self-executing so as to place a legal 
obligation on plaintiffs to pay a higher rate of royalty after 
the State accepted without qualification the payment of the 
stated rate of $.15 per ton of coal produced; that the 
defendants may not retroactively apply their new policy 
imposing a royalty rate of 8%; that the defendants are estopped 
from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the 
audit period at a rate higher than that paid by plaintiffs and 
accepted by defendants; that the defendants have waived their 
right to demand a higher royalty rate than the one accepted 
during the audit period; and that the ruling of the State 
relative to imposing interest and penalties cannot be legally 
enforced. 
The defendants have objected to the granting of the 
Motion and have submitted their own Motion for Summary Judgment 
asking the Court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state 
a cause of action; ordering the plaintiff, Plateau Mining 
Company, to pay the delinquent royalty payment as determined on 
the basis of 8% of gross sales value during the audit period; 
ordering that the plaintiff, Plateau Mining Company, owes 
interest on delinquent royalty payments at a rate set by the 
3oard of State Lands and, further, ordering that the plaintiff, 
Plateau Mining Company, owes penalties on delinquent royalties 
pursuant to the regulation set by the Board. 
Each of the parties have submitted their Memorandums 
of Legal Points and Authorities and have presented to the Court 
Affidavits and Exhibits which the Court has read and considered 
and the Court heard oral arguments from the parties on February 
16, 1988, and took this matter under advisement and rules on 
the Motions as hereinafter stated. 
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Certain undisputed facts are, for the most part, 
agreed upon by the parties as set forth in their respective 
memorandums, and the Court will not attempt to detail all of 
those undisputed facts. There is no dispute as to the fact 
that the plaintiff, Plateau, and their predecessors in interest 
mined coal under a lease from the State of Utah during the 
period April 1, 1979, to December 31, 1984, referred to as the 
"audit period"; that the Lease was entered into on March 15, 
1965, and that the Lease provides as follows: 
"Article III, Second: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on 
or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, 
royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 lbs of coal 
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise 
disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing at the beginning of the 
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal leases of 
land of similar character under coal leases issued by the 
United States at that time, 
whichever is higher, . . .B 
That the lease was on a standard form provided by 
and prepared by the State Land Board, and that throughout the 
audit period the plaintiff, Plateau, or their predecessors in 
interests, filed quarterly with the lessor (State) on a form 
provided by the State a report of the coal mined under the 
Lease and a calculation of the royalty due on the basis of 15C 
per ton. The payment was received and retained by the State 
without question or objection throughout the audit period and 
prior thereto from sometime in 1965. 
The royalty reporting form was provided by the Utah 
Board of State Lands and under the title Royalty Data it has 
two columns. One is headed c/T Basis, and the other is headed 
Percentage Basis. Plateau and their predecessors in interest 
filled in the column entitled c/T Basis and paid the amount of 
royalty shown to be due under that column at 15c per ton and 
left the other column blank. 
After the term of the lease had expired, December 
1984, in approximately February of 1985, the State undertook, 
for the first time, an audit of the royalty payments. The 
audit was completed on or about May 29, 1985, and a demand was 
sent to the plaintiffs for delinquent royalties in October of 
1985. 
It was the conclusion of the audit that the federal 
government, during the audit period, was imposing a royalty on 
coal leases of 8% of the value of the coal removed. Based upon 
the audit, the State made a demand upon the plaintiffs for the 
payment of an additional $2,991,613.44 for delinquent 
royalties, interest and penalties based upon 8% of Gross Sales 
Value of coal removed. 
Based upon an examination of the Lease and the 
parties attempts to comply with its terms, and particularly the 
expressed attitude of the various individuals whose 
responsibility it was to enforce the Lease for and on behalf of 
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the State, the Court finds that as a matter of law the royalty 
provision as contained in Article III, paragraph Second (b) of 
the lease is ambiguous. 
The royalty provision is divided into two parts. 
Part (a) is definite and precise and is capable of definitive 
determination and provides for 15$ per ton on coal produced 
from the leased premises. 
Part (b) leaves the amount due based on several 
factors not immediately capable of definitive determination. 
The ambiguity arises as much from what is not stated and 
provided as from what is stated. In other words, at the 
beginning of the reporting quarter what is the prevailing 
federal rate and who makes that determination, the lessor or 
the lessee, and what factors are to be included in making a 
determination as what federal rate prevails and in what area is 
it prevalent? Who makes the determination that the land in the 
State Lease and the land in the Federal Lease are similar in 
character and what is the basis for determining similarity? 
What time period is used to determine federal leases "issued... 
at that time" and who makes that determination? Even if a 
prevailing federal rate is established, does it apply to the 
"value of the coal removed" as stated in the federal regulation 
or to the "gross sales value" as used by the State auditor in 
his assessment, and who makes that determination? 
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For these reasons, the Court has concluded that 
sub-paragraph (b) is not self-executing as to create a legal 
obligation on the lessee since the identifiable factors 
necessary for self-execution could not independently be 
ascertained by either party. 
Sub-paragraph (b) was written by the State for its 
benefit and since it is not self-executing, it would require 
some affirmitive action on their part to bring the provision of 
that sub-paragraph into an enforceable position other than a 
retroactive audit after having accepted the provisions of 
sub-paragraph (a) without objection or comment. 
Under these circumstances, the Court must look to 
the prior conduct of the lessor and the lessees under the Lease 
over a period of years that show that they chose to ingnore the 
provisions of sub-paragraph (b), and to calculate the royalty 
under sub-paragraph (a). 
Since the State by an established course of conduct 
for many years adopted a construction of the Lease that 
provided for 15c a ton, they are now precluded from asserting a 
different construction of the Lease where they took no 
sufficient or positive action to establish their now asserted 
construction to an ambiguous lease provision. 
Because of the above legal conclusion, it would not 
be necessary for the Court to go further, but as a further 
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ground for what the Court's final conclusion and ruling will 
be, the Court will address other issues presented. 
The Court is of the opinion that regardless of 
whether the status of the land is School Trust Land or not, the 
State acts in its proprietary capacity when it enters into a 
contractual lease that is authorized under law and that the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the State 
and its Land Board as any other contracting individual. 
The Court has concluded as a matter of law that the 
State is estopped from demanding payment of royalty based upon 
the 8% of value figure. The undisputed facts show that the 
State was aware of the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of 
Article III of their own Lease and were made aware by the 
quarterly payments submitted by Plateau and its predecessors in 
interest that those provisions were being ignored by leaving 
that reporting column blank and by accepting, throughout the 
auditing period, without question or objection, royalty based 
upon 15C a ton. If the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) were 
going to be used, the State had a duty to speak which they did 
not do. By their conduct and failure to perform this duty, 
they induced plaintiffs to believe that 15c a ton was the 
acceptable royalty and plaintiffs, in reliance thereon, 
continued to mine coal under the Lease which they would not 
have done had they known that the defendants were going to 
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insist upon the 8% of value provision. The great injustice 
that would result to plaintiffs if we now allow the defendants 
to assert this position, is quite obvious since the record 
shows that to allow the imposition of the greater royalty, the 
plaintiffs would show a substantial loss on all mining activity 
under the State Lease. 
Even if the conclusion is reached that the defendants 
were acting in a governmental capacity, they would still be 
estopped from asserting the new royalty rate. No substantial 
adverse effecc on public policy will result if the defendants 
are estopped from, applying this newly determined royalty 
retroactively. The State can still proceed to lease coal lands 
on any terms ic feels profitable and that will give the State 
the maximum return. They still have the power to revise the 
wording of their coal leases to do away with any ambiguity and 
to carry out any legally established policy. 
Further, the record shows that the plaintiffs would 
not have entered into certain stock purchases and transfers on 
the terms that were then agreed to had they known of the 
State's position and the contemplated change in the royalty 
provision as previously accepted, and that the plaintiffs would 
suffer at this time great economic loss as a result. 
The Court further finds that the State had no right 
under the Lease to impose interest, except on delinquent 
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payments at the legal rate, or any penalty. A legally binding 
lease cannot be altered or added to by by rules and regulations 
adopted subsequently. 
The Lease does state that it is subject to such 
operating rules and regulations as may be hereafter approved 
and adopted. Such a provision could not be interpreted to mean 
changes to or additions of monetary payment. "Operating Rules" 
has reference to method of mining and can have no other logical 
interpretation. Since the amount claimed by the State is not 
subject to definitive determination, any interest that may be 
due could not commence to run until demand is made. 
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants 
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as prayed for 
and denies defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to 
prepare a formal order in accordance with this opinion. 
DATED t h i s ^ K ^ d a y of Feb r u a r y , 1988 
BOYD BUNNELL, D ^ f f r i c t Ju dge 
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Richard B. Johns (USB #1706) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone:' (801) 521-3200 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION 
OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; 
THE UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS 
AND FORESTRY; THE UTAH DEPART-
MENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES; DEE 
HANSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF 




Civil No. 4847 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell 
Plaintiff having moved for Partial Summary Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
the Motion having been considered by the Court, and the Court 
having issued its decision granting the Motion of plaintiff and 
denying the Motion of defendants, and good and sufficient cause 
appearing therefore, the Court hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES: 
1. Defendants are not entitled to recover from 
plaintiff any royalty amounts calculated at any rate higher 
than 15^ per ton of coal produced from State Coal Lease 
No. ML-22603 during the period from 1979 through 1985. 
2. Interest due on any delinquent royalties payable 
under State Coal Lease No. ML-22603 only begins to accrue when 
demand for payment of the delinquent royalties is made, and 
then accrues at the statutory legal rate of interest. 
3. The parties hereto shall bear their respective 
costs and attorneys' fees. 
DATED this 3rd day of August 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 







Calvin L. Rampton (USB #2682) 
Richard B. Johns (USB #1706) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: . (801) 521-3200 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION 
OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; 
THE UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS 
AND FORESTRY; THE UTAH DEPART-
MENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES; DEE 
HANSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF 
THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 4847 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell 
Plaintiff, having moved for Partial Summary Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
the Motion having been considered by the Court, and the Court 
having considered the Uncontroverted Facts and Exhibits as set 
forth in the agreed Pre-trial Order and having considered each 
party's Memoranda of Legal Points and Authorities, and now 
being well advised in the premises, hereby enters its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Uncontroverted Facts set forth in the Pre-trial 
Order are accepted by the Court as established for purposes of 
this case. Based upon said Pre-trial Order the Court makes the 
following findings of fact: 
1. Trail Mountain Coal Company and its predecessors 
in interest mined coal under State Mineral Lease No. 22603 (the 
"Lease") during the period from 1979 through 1985. 
2. The Lease was on a standard form prepared by the 
State Land Board. 
3. Article III of the Lease provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
The Lessee, in consideration of the 
granting of the rights and privileges 
aforesaid, hereby covenants and agrees as 
follows: 
SECOND:. To pay Lessor quarterly, on or 
before the 15th day of the month succeeding 
each quarter, royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15?f per ton of 
2,000 lbs. of coal produced from the 
-2-
leased premises and sold or otherwise 
disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the 
beginning of the quarter for which 
payment is being made, for federal 
lessees of land of similar character 
under coal leases issued by the United 
States at that time, 
whichever is higher, . . . 
4. The state provided Trail Mountain Coal Company 
and its predecessors with a form for reporting coal production 
and royalties under the lease. The form has two columns for 
calculating royalties. One column is headed gf/T Basis and the 
other is headed Percentage Basis. 
5. Throughout the period of mining, Trail Mountain 
Coal Company and its predecessors filed the reporting form on a 
quarterly basis with the State of Utah. Trail Mountain Coal 
Company and its predecessors calculated royalties by filling in 
the column on the form labeled d/Ton Basis, and paid the amount 
of royalty shown to be due under that column at 15jf per ton of 
coal produced. The other column, labeled Percentage Basis, was 
left blank on each form. 
6. Trail Mountain Coal Company and its predecessors 
made royalty payments to the State of Utah for each quarter of 
the years 1979 through 1985 during which coal was produced, on 
the basis of 15^ 5 per ton, as calculated on the reporting form. 
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7. Each reporting form and each royalty payment was 
received and retained by the State without question or 
objection. 
8. At various times prior to and during the period 
of mining, there was written and verbal correspondence between 
the State of Utah and Trail Mountain Coal Company or its 
predecessors, regarding the royalty provision of the Lease and 
the amounts payable thereunder, 
9. The conduct of the Lessor and the Lessees under 
the Lease over a period of years shows that they chose not to 
apply subparagraph (b) of the royalty provision, and to 
calculate the royalty under subparagraph (a). 
10. In approximately March of 1985, the State 
undertook, for the first time, an audit of the royalty payments. 
11. On or about October 15, 1985, the State provided 
Trail Mountain Coal Company with a copy of the royalty audit, 
and demanded payment for royalties it alleged to be delinquent. 
12. It was the conclusion of the audit that Trail 
Mountain Coal Company and its predecessors should have been 
paying royalties at the rate of 8% of the value of coal 
removed. Based upon the audit, the State made demand upon 
Trail Mountain Coal Company for the payment of an additional 
$5,222,197.20 for delinquent royalties, interest and penalties. 
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13. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court now enters its Conclusions of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The royalty provision contained in Article III, 
subparagraph (b) of the Lease, is ambiguous. 
2. Ambiguities in the Lease should be construed 
against the State. 
3. The alternate royalty provision of subparagraph 
(b) of the Lease is not self-executing so as to create a legal 
obligation on the Lessee. 
4. Some affirmative action on the State's part other 
than a retroactive audit was required to bring the alternate 
royalty provision into an enforceable position. 
5. The Lease should be enforced in accordance with 
the parties interpretation and course of conduct. 
6. Since the parties, by an established course of 
conduct for many years, and by their interpretation of the 
Lease, adopted a construction of the Lease that provided for 
payment of royalties at the rate of 15^ per ton, the State is 
now precluded from asserting a different construction of the 
Lease retroactively. 
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7. Since the State took no sufficient or positive 
action to establish the construction of the ambiguous Lease 
provision which the State now asserts, the State is precluded 
from doing so retroactively. 
8. The above Conclusions of Law are sufficient to 
support a judgment granting plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. Although it is not necessary for the Court 
to go further, the Court also makes the following Conclusions 
of Law. 
9. The State acted in a proprietary capacity in 
entering into the Lease. 
10. The doctrine of estoppel may be applied against 
the State. 
11. The State is estopped from demanding and 
collecting royalty payments for coal mined under the Lease in 
any amount greater than 15^ per ton for the period from 1979 
through 1985. 
12. The State had no right under the Lease to impose 
interest, except on delinquent payments of the 15<£ per ton 
royalty at the legal rate, or any penalty. 
13. Any interest that may be due on delinquent 
payments does not commence to run until demand is made. 
-6-
14. There is no dispute as to the material facts in 
this case, and plaintiff is entitled to Partial Summary 
Judgment as prayed for. — 
DATED this ^ 7 7 ~day of /sAfsfsr?S* 1988 
/^-Boyd^unn^dl, Drs-tfict Judge 
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MINERAL LEASE APPLICATION MINERAL LEASE N O . 
NO . , 0 , ftdcbdim1/ GRANT: Sc"Dl 
Utah State Lease for 
COAL 
THIS INDENTURE OF I EASE A N D AGREEMENT entered into in duplicate this *.t-Il day of _ 1 C > r U S r y j 0 
by and Herueen the STATE LAND BOARD, acting in behalf of the State of Utah, hereinafter called the Lessor, and 
I.ALC0L: II. llciCIKKo:1 
\??2 South Hrin S t r e e t 
bait Li»-c C U y , Utah 84)01 
party of the second part, hereinafter called the Lessee, under and Pursuant to Title 65, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
>X ITNESSETH. That the Lessor, in consideration of the rents and royalties to be pail and the co\enants to be observe' by the Leasee, as herr-
imfter set forth, does hereby grant ind lease to the Le see the exclusive nehr and p'lvile^e to mine, remove, a«"d dispo«e of a'l of the 
said minerals in, upon, or under the following? described tract of land situited in 1 CT^ Coun ,, State of Utah, to-wit 
A l l of t ccLLen Ti i -I • - n - : (Z ) , T«r » f .1 !• vet ' m > ('7) Ecu -I , •'.' r 
Si : . ( ) K r s . , ±... L ' o . c :*'•>< , 
conn nm«: a ton! of , - 4 - r . . U
 a c f f ^ m i r e o r j e s S | together with the ncht to use and occupy so much of th* surface of said land as 
rmy be required for ill purpo es reasomblv incident to the minmr, removil, an! dt pos il of said minerals, ace ^rdmg to the provisions of this 
lease, for the pen->d endni. ten years after the first diy of January next succeeding the date hereof and as long thernf er as 'ltd minerals miy 
be rroduced in c mmtMi l ijuannties frc m said lmJs or Lessee sh«l! continue to mike the pavrnents recuitcd b, Article III hereof, upon 
condition thit at the cn i of rath rv enty {20) y c r period succeeding the first diy cf the yeir in which this I d s ; is i^  led, such readjustment 
of terms and conditions may be m ide is the lessor ma, determine to be ne^essarv m the interest of the St ite 
ARTICLE I 
This lease is printed subject in all respects to and under the conditions of the la AS of tl e Snte of Utnh ind existing rules and regulations 
and such operating rules and regulations as may be he cafter approved and adopted b> th- Stale Lind Board 
ARTICLE f7 
This lease covers only the mining, removal, ind disrxvil of the minerals specifird in this lease, bu* the Lessee shall promptly notify the 
the Lessor of the discovery of any minerals e\«.rr'mq those enumeritc I herein 
ARTICLE III 
The Lessee, in consideration of the grantm* of the nght-> ind privileges aforesnd, hereby covenints and aprees as follows: 
TIRST- To piy to the Lessor as rennl for tne land covered by this leise the sum of fifty (50) cents per icre per annum All such annual 
piyments of rental shall be made in advance c>iy the 2nd diy cf January of e-.Ji year, except the 1 71; J __ rental which is payable 
on the execution of this lease All rental* shall be credited agnnst royalties for the year in which they accrue 
SFCOND* To pa> to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty 
(a ) at the rate of 15<* per ton of 2000 lbs of io.il product d from the h i v d pirmncs and sold or otherwise disposed of, or 
(b) at the rite prevailing, at the begtntmir of the quarter for whuh payment is being made, for federal lessees of land of similar char-
acter under coaTTeases issued by the United State* at tint time, 
whichever is higher, an 1, commencing with the >ear bcpnnmn the January 1 following two >eirs from the d re hereof, to p»y annual roya'ty 
of at least Si 0C multiplied by the number of acres h~ub , leised recatdless of actual production, provided thit Lessor may, at any time at'er 
the tenth anniversary elate hereof, increase the minimum annual royalty by not to exceed 50*/e 
If the coal produced from the leased premises Is washed before sale or other disposition by Lessee, Lessee may pty royalty on the washed 
product only, provided Les«ee maintains accurate record by which the weight of washed coal originating from the leased pren.'.es can be 
ascertained and complies with all reputations and directives issued by Lessor to prevent waste and to insure that royalty is paid on all washed 
coal originating from the leased premises. 
THIRD: T O prepare and forward to the State Land Office, on or before the 15th day of the month next succeeding the quarter in which 
the material is produced, a certified statement of the amount of production of all of the leased substances disposed of from said lands, and 
such other additional information as the State Land Board may from time to time require. 
FOURTH: To keep at tire mine office dear, accurate and detailed mans on tracing cloth, en a scale not more than 50 feet to the inch, 
of the workings in e.-nh section of the leased lands and on the lands adjacent, said maps to be coordinated with reference to a public land cor-
ner so that they can be readily and correctly superimposed, and to furnish to the Lessor annually, or upon demand, certified copies of such 
maps and such written statements of operations as may be called for. All surveys shall be made by a licensed engineer and all maps certified 
to by him. 
FIFTH: Not to fence or otherwise make inaccessihe to stock any watering place on the premises without first obtaining the written consent 
of Les*or, nor to permit or contribute to the pollution of any surface or subsurface wafer available or capable of being made available for domestic 
or irrigation use. 
SIXTH: Not to assign this lease or any interest therein, nor sublet any portion of the leased premises, or any of the rights and privileges 
herein granted, without the written consent of the Lessor being first had and obtained. 
ARTICLE IV 
The Lessor hereby excepts and reserves from the operation of this lease: 
FIRST: 7K- rinhi to permit for joint or several use such cerements or rights-of-way upon, through, or in the land hereby leased as may 
be necessarv or appropriate to the working cf these or other lands belonging to or administered by the Lessor containing mineral deposits 
or for other use. 
SFCON'P: The rir'"t t> ir-r. le-se, <c!l, or otherwise d it, pose of the surface of said land:, or any part thereof, under existing Stare laws 
or laws hereafter er •-' I, irr -.far as said surface is not necessary for the I.esee in the mining, removal, or disposal of the leased substances there-
in, an J to lc:iie mineral depos-.t-, c'hsr tfnn those Ira.-ed herelv, which may be contained in said lands so long as the recovery of such de-
posits does not unreasonably interfere with Lessee's right* herein granted. 
ARTICLE V 
I Tpon f:r!tir" or icfn il of the lr rr to accept the readjustment of term": and conditions demanded by the Lesfor at thr end of any twenty-
year period, SULII failure \-r refrsal '.hall work a forfeiture of the lease and the fame shall be canceled. 
ARTICLE VJ 
In ea'-e of i_\-pira'ion. forfeiture, surrrn.Icr o: other terrnoaticn cf thi- lea?e, all underground timbering supports, shaft lininrr. rails and 
other in'-taltarii rv- nere'-.-rv f >r the support of m lcr<;-ound workings of any mincr. and all rails or head frames and all instillations which 
cannot be remove! v. ithou: prrrr.ancnt imury to the p-cmi.-cs and all con^tru- ticn and equipment installed underground to provide ventilation 
for anv mine-, up n or in •••. *::d land- shall he and remain a part of the realrv nnd shall revert to the Lessor without further consideration or 
compeir-ation ;<r.A -hall he left hv th • lv ce in the lands. 
AH person-1 pr-;cr»v of ].r • <-ce located within or upon the said land*, and all build,nr-, machinery, equipment and tools (other than the 
in• talbtions to rv;<;r"- rhr property of l.r^.'r a above provided), shall b<* and remain the property of Lessee and Lessr* <hall he entitled to, 
and m?'-', within six (' ) months a'tcr *uch expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other termination of sai.l lease, or within ruch extension of 
time as mav be gram* ! bv lessor, remove from thr s.-jd lands su.h personal property arid improvements, other than those items which are 
to remain the property :f the I e s••>- as nhnc provided. 
Leasee sh ••!!, i:p >n terrmrv t- ->n, of this Ic.-.se or nK-ndonmrnr of t!-.e leased premise for any reason, seal to Lessor's satisfaction all or such 
part of the mine opvr.it,;:s »n th- prcmi'cs- as Les'.or shall request be sealed. 
ARTICLE Vll 
It sh.il! \x the responsibility of the Lessee xo slope the sidrs of all operations of a surface nature to an angle of not less than 45° or to 
erect » barrier arom-d -r h operation a- thr State Land Hoard may require. Such sloping or fencing shall become n normal part of the opera-
tion of the lease so r.s to Irvf pace with such operation to the extent that such operation shall not constitute a hazard. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Lessee shall not *eM cr otherwise drspose of anv water rights acquired for use upon the leased premises except with Lessor's written per-
mission. Ufxm termination of this lease for any reason, all such rights acquired by application to the Utah State Engineer shall revert to the 
Lessor as an appurtenance to the leajed premises, and all such rights acquired by other means shall be offered to Lessor in writing for purchase 
at Lessee's acquisition costs, provided that Lessor shall be deemed to have rejected such offer if it doe< not accept the same within thirty 
days after receipt thereof. 
ARTICLE IX 
All of the terms, covenants, conditions, and obligations in this lease contained, shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, 
and assigns of the Lessee. 
ARTICLE X 
Lessee may terminate this lease at any time upon giving three (3) months' notice in writing to the Lessor and upon payment of all 
rents and royalties and other sums due and payable to the Lessor, and upon complying with the terms of this lease with respect to the preser-
vation of the working-? in such order and condition as to permit of the continued operation of the leased premises. 
ARTICLE XI 
Lessor, its olfice" and agent*-, shall have the right at all times to go in and upon the leased lands and premises, during the term of said 
lease to inspect thr work done and the progress thereof on said lands and the products obtained therefrom, and to post any notices on the 
said land that it may deem fit and proper; and also shall permit any authorized representatives of the Lessor to examine all books and records 
pertaining to operations under this lease, and to make copies of and extracts from the same, if desired. 
ARTICLE XII 
This lease is issued only under such title as the State of Utah may now hold, and that in the event the State is hereafter divested of such 
title, the Lessor shall not be liable for any damages sustained by the Lessee, nor shall the Lessee be entited to or claim any refund of rentals 
or royalties or other monies theretofcre paid to the Lessor. 
ARTICLE XJfJ 
STATE OF UTAH 




^ ^ ? ^ ^ t ! ^ ^ 2 ^ ^ ^ ^ 5 t 
LESSEE 
I-STATE OF UTAH LESSEE'S INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT COUNTY OF 
On the Jay of 19 , personally appeared befurr me 
the signer of rhr above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that executed the same. 
Given under my hand and seal this clay of 19 
My commi^iim Expires: Notary Public, residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
LESSEE'? CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
On the day of 19 , personally appeared l>eforc me , 
who being duly sworn did say that he is an officer of anJ that said instrument was signed 
in behalf of said corporation by resolution of its Board of Directors, and paid „ acknowl-
edged to me th.it said corporation executed the same. 
Given under my hand and seal this day of 19......... 
My commission Expires: Nctary Public, residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) -
On the ..J/S-* day of ./J. ^U.. A 19..:...:., personally appeared before me Max C. Gardner, who bring by me duly sworn 
did lay that he is the Director of the State Land Board cf the State of Utah and that said instrument was sipned in behalf of said Board by 
rrsolution of the Board, and said Max C. Gardner acknowledged to me that said Board executed the same in behalf of the State of Utah. 
Given under my hand and seal this day of —*-.J/!.J.X'*&.'-U:JZL 19:1 1 
^Z-.^LJJL.Z^. , 
My commission Expires: Notary Public, reiiding at: X 
i ) , . ^ WO 
t- i l J/• 4*»* ' i ' / > ' / < ; l / > 
n i 
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Federal Coal Leases Issued In Utah 
January 1, 1979 to December 31, 1985 





T21S, R5E. Sec 32. 33 
T22S, R5E. Sec 4, 5. 7. 
8. 17. 18 
3-1-79 U32083 Kaiser Coal T14S. R14E, Sec 6, 8, 17 











12-1-79 U25683 Blackhawk Coal 
1-18-80 U82996.02 Trail Mtn Coal T17S. R6E. Sec 25 
T12S. R9E, Sec 25. 26 
T12S. R10E, Sec 28-30 
3-26-80 U08319,#3 Beaver Creek T13S. R7E. Sec 13 





Coastal States T21S, R4E, Sec 25. 36 
T21S. R5E, Sec 30 
Utah Power & Lt T17S. R7E, Sec 27-34 
T18S, R7E. Sec 4,5 
Utah Power & Lt T16S. R7E, Sec 34 
T17S. R7E, Sec 3. 4 
Kanawha Hocking T13S, R7E. Sec 3. 9. 10. 15, 
Kenllworth. Castlegate D,B,A 
Sub-seam 1, 2, & 3 
Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon, 
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Utah Power & Lt 
Location 
T13S. R7E, Sec 1-3, 11-14, 
23, 24 
T13S, R7E, Sec 13, 24 
T13S, R8E, Sec 19 
T21S, R7E, Sec 31, 33 
T22S, R7E, Sec 4-8. 17, 18 
Seam(s) 
Lower O'Conner, Hiawatha, 





Utah Power & Lt 
Blshopgate Coal 
W K Minerals 
Mtn States Res. 
Consol Coal 50% 
Chevron 50% 
AMCA Coal 
T36S, R2E, Sec 13, 14. 23-26, 35 Alvey, Rees, Chrlstensen 
T36S, R3E, Sec 19. 30, 31 
T37S. R2E, Sec 1, 11-14. 24, 25 
T37S. R3E, Sec 5-7, 18. 19, 27-31 
T38S, R3Ef Sec 3-7, 8. 9, 17 
T13S. RUE, Sec 12. 13 
T16S, R7E, Sec 32 
T12S, R7E, Sec 30 
T17S, R6E, Sec 25, 26, 35 
T24S, R5E, Sec 17-21. 28 
T22S. R6E, Sec 22 







Rock Canyon, GlIson 
Blind Canyon, Hiawatha 
No Data 
Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon, 
Hiawatha 
Iv1e Bed 
I, J. C. & D 
Lower Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon, 
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Royalty 
Date Lease No. Lessee Location Seam(s) Rate 
10-1-85 U51923 U S Fuel T15S, R8E, Sec 20 Hiawatha. 2nd & 3rd. Watis, 8.00X 
Tank 
1 of 5 
Date 
Adj. 











Utah Power & Lt 
Utah Power & Lt 
Utah Power 8, Lt 
Location 
T39S, R5W. Sec 
T36S, R2E, Sec 
T17S, R7E. Sec 
















Utah Power b Lt 
Utah Power I Lt 
Utah Power h Lt 
Utah Power h Lt 
A.M. Rassmussen 
Utah Power h Lt 
AMCA Coal 
SCHEDULE II 
Federal Leases 1n Utah Adjusted During the Audit Period 




Bear Canyon, Hiawatha 
Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon, 
Hiawatha 
Blind Canyon, Hiawatha 
Henderson 
Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon 
Hiawatha 
Hiawatha 
Hiawatha. Rear Canyon, 
BlInd Canyon 
No Data 
Upper Meadow Brook 
Blind Canyon, Bear Canyon 
Hiawatha 
Upper Sunnyslde, Abek Canyon. Fish 
Creek. Gllson Bed, Kenllworth, 
Royal Blue, Castlegate B & A 
Aberdeen 
T17S. R7E. Sec 4-5. 0-10. 15-17 
T3f>S, R2W. Sec 23 
16S, R7E, Sec 28 
T16S. R7E, Sec 20. 21 
T17S, R7E, Sec 13-14, 23-24. 2f> 
T16S. R7E, Sec 19-20, 29-30 
T40S. ROW. Sec 32 
T17S. R7E. Sec 11-12. 14 




























2 of 5 SCHCOULC II 
rederal Leases In Utah Adjusted During the Audit Porlod 
January 1, 1979 to December 31, 1905 
date 

















Brlgham Young U. 
Brlgham Young U. 
Blackhawk Coal 
-1-81 SL029093 Blackhawk Coal 
-1-81 U0S8184 Blackhawk Coal 
Location 
T12S. R9E, Sec 30. 31 
T39S, R9W, Sec 24-26 
T14S, R6E, Sec 25 
T17S, R7E, Sec 3 
T16S, R7E. Sec 13, 14 
T16S, R7E, Sec 26 
T13S, R9E, Sec 7 
T13S, ROE. Sec 1 
T12S, R9E, Sec 31 
T13S, R9E, Sec 3 
T12S. R9E, Sec 26-28 
T12S. R9E, Sec 33 
T13S. R9E, Sec 3-5 
Seam(s) 
Pre-Adjustcd Post-Adjusted 
Royal ty RoyALLy 
-1-81 U024319 Utah Power & Lt T16S, R7E, Sec 27, 28, 33, 34 




Upper Bed, Bear Canyon, 
Blind Canyon, Hiawatha 
No Data 
No Data 
Castlegate A, Spring Canyon, 
Sub-seam 3 
Aberdeen 
Castlegate A, B, Kenllworth 
Sub-seam 1,2,3 
Kenl1 worth 
Castlegate A, B, C, D, Aberdeen, 
Sub-seam 2, 3 
Castlegate A, B, 0 
Aberdeen, Sub-seam 1, 2, 3, 
Kenl1 worth 
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Date 

























T36S, R2E, Sec 13. 14 No Data 
T37S, R2E. Sec 1, 14. 24 No Data 
T37S. R3E, Sec 5-7. 18-19. 27. 31 Alvey Coal 20 
-1-83 SL060746 Nevada Electric 
T15S. R7E. Sec 13. 14. 25 
T12S. R10E, Sec 33. 34 
T13S. R10E. Sec 3 
T13S. R8E, Sec 7. 8. 17. 18 
T17S, R6E. Sec 25 
T17S, R7E, Sec 27 
T15S, R7E. Sec 36 
T15S. R8E. Sec 31 
T16S. R7E. Sec 1. 12 
T16S, R8E, Sec 5-8 
T16S, R7E. Sec 1. 12 
T16S, R8E. Sec 6-8 
T35S, R1E, Sec 8 
T39S, R5W, Sec 7, 17-20. 29 
T39S, R6W, Sec 11-14 
T39S, R5W. Sec 29. 32. 33 
T40S, R5W, Sec 4. 5 
No Data 
Kenl1 worth 




Castlegate A. Hiawatha, Gordon Bed, 15^/Ton 
No. 1 Seam, Upper Beds 
Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon 






Hiawatha. Blind Canyon. 
Bear Canyon 
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Date 
AdJL Lease No. Lessee 






Mtn. States Res. 
Nevada Electric 
Nevada Electric 
















T39S, R5W, Sec 30, 31 
T39S, R6W, Sec 25 
T39S. R6W, Sec 14, 23. 26 
T40S. R5W, Sec 8 
T24S, R5E, Sec 17-21, 28 
T40S, R5W, Sec 17, 19, 20, 29 
T39S, R6W, Sec 26, 27, 34. 35 
T40S, R6W. Sec 3-5, 8-10 
T15S. R8E, Sec 7, 8 
T15S. R7E, Sec 1, 12-13 
T16S. R7E. Sec 5. 6 
T13S. R12E, Sec 13, 23-26 
T13S. R13E, Sec 18, 19, 30 
T14S. R7E. Sec 6. 7 
T13S. R8E, Sec 11. 12 
T40S. R4E, Sec 20, 28, 29, 33. 
T39S, R6W, Sec 13, 24 













Above Waltls Bed 
Third Bed, Second Bed, Waltls, 
Hiawatha 
Blind Canyon, Hiawatha 
Lower Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon, 
Fish Creek, Gllson, Kenllworth 
Upper 0'Conner, Lower 0'Conner 
Castlegate A, B, Spring Canyon 
Bed Above KenlIworth 
H, I, J, Kl, K2, L, M, N, 0 
Smlrl 
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Date 
Adj. Lease No. 
* 3-1-85 U0140770 
* 6-1-85 U0105404 





* 6-6-85 U098775 Nevada Electric 








T40S, R5W, Sec 24-27, 34 
T40S, R5W, Sec 14, 23-27 
T40S, R4W, Sec 7, 18 
T40S, R4-2W, Sec 8, 9 
T40S, R4-2W, Sec 17, 18 
T40S, R5W, Sec 13 
T39S, R4W, Sec 33 
T40S, R4W, Sec 4-8 
T42S, R3E, Sec 13-15 
T40S, R3E, Sec 1 






Smlrl, Bald Knoll 
B. Basil, C, A-2, A-l 
H, I, J, Kl, K2, L, M, Nt 
B, Basil, C, A-2, A-l 
^The readjustment on these leases was appealed to the BLM. 
The readjustments were upheld. 
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Federal Leases 1n Utah Ineligible or Falling to Receive Adjustment 
by the BLM During the Audit Period 
January 1, 1979 to December 31, 1985 
Issue 
Date Lease No. Lessee 
9-1-25 SL027304 AMCA Coal 
Location 
T13S, R U E , Sec 7, 18 






R.W. Humphreys T13S, R10E, Sec 11 
Sunedco Coal T13S. R U E , Sec 12. 13 
T13S, R12E, Sec 7, 8. 17, 18 
Genwal Coal T14S, R6E, Sec 13 
Kanawha-Hocking T13S, R7E, Sec 27, 34 
T14S, R7E, Sec 3, 10 
Coastal States T21S, R4E, Sec 36 
T21S, R5E, Sec 31 
T22S, R4E, Sec 1. 12 
T22S, R5E, Sec 6, 7 
2-3-45 SL064900 Utah Power & Lt T17S. R7E, Sec 22 
1-24-46 SL064903 Beaver Creek T16S, R7E, Sec 16 
10-4-46 SL064607 Utah Power & Lt T17S, R7E, Sec 2, 3, 10 
Audit Period 
Seam(s) Royalty Rate 
Aberdeen, Lower Sunnyslde, Upper 15^/Ton 
Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon, Gil son. 
Royal Blue, Castlegate A, B 
Lower Sunnyslde, Kenllworth 15^/Ton 
Royal Blue, Castlegate A, C 
D, Kenllworth, Ce, B, A 15^/Ton 
Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon, Gil son 15^/Ton 
Castlegate A, Candland, Upper Beds 15^/Ton 
Bob Wright 150/Ton 
Upper Hiawatha 15^/Ton 
Grimes Wash, Bear Canyon, 17.5^/Ton 
Blind Canyon, Hiawatha 
Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon, 15^/Ton 
Hiawatha 
Lower Hiawatha, Hiawatha 17.5^/Ton 
Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon 
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T15S, R7E, Sec 25, 26 
T16S, R7E, Sec 1, 12, 13 
T16S, R8E, Sec 7, 18-20 
T16S, R14E, Sec 24-26, 35 
T12S, R9E, Sec 26-29 
T14S, RUE, Sec 10-14, 24 




Upper Bed, Bear Canyon, Hiawatha 
Sunnyside Bed, Upper Sunnyside, 
Lower Sunnyside 
Castlegate A, B, C, D, 
Sub-seam 1,2,3 
Upper Sunnyside, Lower Sunnyside 
Lower Sunnyside, Rock Canyon, 
Fish Creek, Gilson Bed, Kenllworth 
Royal Blue 
TUS. RUE, Sec 19, 20. 28-31, 33 Lower Sunnyside 
T16S, R14E, Sec 25 
T16S, R15E, Sec 30, 31 
T16S, R14E, Sec 12 
TUS, R6E, Sec 36 
TUS, R7E, Sec 31 
T14S, R6E, Sec 1 
T14S, R7E, Sec 6 
Sunnyside Bed, Upper Sunnyside, 
Lower Sunnyside 
Sunnyside Bed. Upper Sunnyside, 
Lower Sunnyside 













6-1-57 U019524 Blackhawk Coal TUS, R8E, Sec 35 Bob Wright. Castlegate A 12.5*/Ton 
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T13S. R12E. Sec 10, 11, 14, 15, 
22, 23 
T16S, R7E, Sec 24, 25 
T16S, R7E, Sec 25 
T16S, R8E, Sec 30, 31 
T16S. R7E, Sec 10-14 
T13S, R13E. Sec 33-35 
TMS, R13E, Sec 3-5, 9,10 
TMS. R7E, Sec 17, 20, 21 
T13S. R6E, Sec 13. M , 23-26 
T21S, R5E. Sec 26 
T21S. R5E. Sec 20. 29, 32. 33 
T23S, R6E. Sec 4-5, 0-9. 17. 
19-20 
T23S, R6E, Sec 20-21, 20-33 
T24S, R6E, Sec 5-7 
T24S, R5E, Sec 1, 12 
Seam(s) 
Lower Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon, 




























62 U089096 Sunoco Energy T13S, R12E, Sec 0, 17 Lower Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon 
Fish Creek, Gllson, Kenllworth 
15^/Ton 
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Date Lease No. Lessee Location 
-2-62 U090231 Consolidation T24S, R5E, Sec 13, 14, 23. 25, 
26, 35 
























T13S, R6E, Sec 13, 14, 24 
T17S, R7E, Sec 4-7, 17, 18 
T17S, R6E. Sec 1, 12, 13 
T13S, R6E, Sec 11, 14 
T23S, R5E, Sec 12, 13 
T23S, R6Ef Sec 6, 7 
T23S, R5E, Sec 24. 25 
T23S. R6E, Sec 19, 30, 31 
T24S, R5E, Sec 3 
T24S, R5E, Sec 23 
T23S, R5E, Sec 26. 34, 35 
T13S. R6E, Sec 26, 27, 34. 35 
T12S, R10E, Sec 33-35 
T12S. R10E. Sec 26, 27 
Seam(s) 
"A" Coal Bed 
Lower Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon 





Upper O'Conner, Lower 01Conner 
Blind Canyon, Hiawatha 
No Data 
Upper 0'Conner, Lower 0'Conner 
3 Unnamed 
I, C, D, A 
Lower A, Upper C, Upper I, 




Upper O'Conner, Lower O'Conner 
Kenilworth, Castlegate A, B, C. D 
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Date Lease No. 
-1-67 U1358 
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Federal Leases In Utah Ineligible or Falling to Recelvev Adjustment 
by the 8LM During the Audit Period 
January 1, 1979 to December 31, 1985 
Lessee Location 
Utah Power & Lt T17S. R7E, Sec 22, 27 
Smith Holladay T16S. R7E, Sec 28 
Beaver Creek T13S, R8E, Sec 13 
Consolidation T22S, R6E. Sec 19. 20. 29 
Carroll County T16S, R7E, Sec 31 
Getty Minerals T15S. R8Ef Sec 17 
Getty Minerals T15S. R7E, Sec 14, 23. 25. 26 
W.A. Land Co. T16S, R7E. Sec 28, 29. 33 
Seam(s) 
Hiawatha, Bear Canyon, 
Blind Canyon 
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Federal Leases In Utah Eligible for Adjustment During the Audit Period 
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But With Appeals Pending as of October, 1987 
Adj. 

























T17S, R7E, Sec 15-17. 20-22, 
27-29 
T17S, R6E. Sec 13, 15, 25 
T17S. R7E, Sec 17-20, 29, 30 
T13S, R U E , Sec 7, 8, 18 
T14S, R13E, Sec 1, 12, 13, 24, 
T14S, R14E. Sec 7, 18, 30, 31 
T16S, R14E, Sec 13, 24. 25 
T16S, R15E, Sec 19, 29. 30, 31 
T17S, R15E, Sec 5, 6 
T17S, R14E, Sec 1. 12 
T17S, R15E. Sec 5-8 
T40S, R4E, Sec 31 
T41S. R4E, Sec 5, 6 
T41S, R3E, Sec 1, 12 
T41S, R4E, Sec 7 
T41S, R4E. Sec 8-10 
T41S. R4E, Sec 13. 23-25 
T41S, R4E, Sec 18-21 
Seam(s) 
Blind Canyon, Hiawatha 
Bear Canyon 
No Data 
Blind Canyon, Hiawatha 
Issue Current Proposed 
Date Roya1ty Royalty 
3-1-62 15tf/Ton 81 
3-1-62 15tf/Ton 81 
Castlegate A, Gllson Bed, Aberdeen, 8-3-42 15tf/Ton 
Lower Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon, 
Royal Blue 
Sunnyslde Bed, Upper Sunnyslde 
Lower Sunnyslde 








25 Upper Sunnyslde, Lower Sunnyslde 11-12-43 15^/Ton 81 
12-1-63 15tf/Ton 81 
12-1-63 15tf/Ton 81 
11-1-65 17.5tf/Ton 81 
11-1-65 17.5^/Ton 81 
11-1-65 17.5f/Ton 81 
11-1-65 17.5^/Ton 81 
11-1-65 17.5tf/Ton 81 
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T41S. R3E, Sec 10, 11. 14, 15 
T40S, R3E, Sec 13, 24. 25 
T40S, R3E, Sec 12 
T41S, R3E, Sec 19. 30, 31 
T41S, R3Ef Sec 6, 7, 18 
T41S. R3E, Sec 3. 4, 9 
T41S, R3E. Sec 5. 8, 17 
T42S, R3E, Sec 7, 17, 18 
T41S, R4E. Sec 17 
T40S, R3E, Sec 26. 33-35 
T40S, R3E, Sec 28-31 
T40S, R3E, Sec 10, 11, 14, 15 
T40S, R3E, Sec 21-23. 27 
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